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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20010495-CA
vs
Priority No. 2

WADE WILLIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503 is unconstitutional on its face because

it prohibits mere possession of a firearm? Constitutional challenges to statutes are
questions of law reviewed by this Court for correctness. State v. In, 2000 UT App 358, ^
3, 18 P.3d 500. This issue was preserved in a motion to dismiss (R. 45-124, 191).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 6
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature
from defining the lawful use of arms.
1

Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 26
The provisions of this Constitution are mandator}' and prohibitory, unless
bv express words thev are declared to be otherwise.

Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a)
A category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses or
has under his custody or control: any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Wade Willis appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the

Honorable Gary D. Stott, Fourth District Court, after the entry of a conditional plea to the
charge of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony.
B.

Trial Court Proceecngs and Disposition
Wade Willis was chat tied by information filed in Fourth District Court on August

15, 2000, with possession ot a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a), and theft, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-6-404, 412 (R. 2).
On October 4, 2000, a preliminary hearing was held at which time Willis was
bound over for trial on the charges upon a finding of probable cause; and pleas of "not
guilty" were entered upon arraignment (R. 18, 191 at 26).
On October 11, 2000, Willis filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on grounds that
the probation search of his residence constituted an illegal warrantless search under the

2

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 23-29). After a hearing on
January 2. 200 L Judge Gary D Stott denied the motion (R 42-43, 192J.
On Januarv 4. 2001. Willis filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that Utah Code
Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) is unconstitutional on its face and in violation of therightto
keep and bear arms set forth in Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution (R. 45-124). On
February 6, 2001, Judge Stott denied the motion (R. 142-43).
On March 23, 2001, Willis entered a plea of "guilty" to possession of a firearm by
a restricted person, a second degree felony, conditioned upon his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress and motion to dismiss (R. 164-71, 172-74, 177).
On May 11, 2001, Willis was sentenced to 180-days in the Utah County Jail,
ordered to pay a fine, and placed on supervised probation for a period of thirty-six
months (R. 180-82).
On June 8, 2001, Willis filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth District Court and this
action commenced (R. 184).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Jonathan Coones testified that he is the owner of a 9-milimeter handgun (R. 191 at
5). Coones testified that in August of 2000 the gun was kept on the top shelf of a closet
in his motor home which was located in his backyard in Spanish Fork (R. 191at 5, 7, 10).
Coones testified that he knows Willis and that Willis was given permission to enter the
motor home by Coones' mother (R. 191 at 5-6). Sometime later, Coones discovered that
his gun was missing (R. 191 at 6). Coones asked Willis about the gun but Willis denied
taking it (R. 191 at 7). At the time, the gun turned up missing the lock on the motor home
door did not work and a few other people had access to the motor home (R. 191 at 8).
3

Eric Price, an employee of Adult Probation & Parole, testified that he is Willis'
probation officer and that in August of 2000 Willis was on felony probation for evading a
police officer, a third degree felony (R. 191 at 15). Price testified that he received a call
from Detective Mitchell and was informed that Willis was a suspect of a theft of a
firearm from Coones (R. 191 at 17-18). On August 1, 2000, Price-based on the
information he received from Mitchell—searched Willis' home located at 1516 South 320
East in Orem; and was present when a 9-millimeter firearm was found in Willis'
bedroom closet (R. 191 at 15-16, 18).
Brad Mitchell, a detective with the Spanish Fork Police Department, testified that
he investigated a complaint from Coones concerning the missing handgun (R. 191 at 2021). Mitchell contacted Adult Probation & Parole and directed them to Willis' home (R.
191 at 21). The serial number provided by Coones was the same serial number that was
on the gun found at Willis' residence (R. 191 at 21). Mitchell later interviewed Willis
and was told that "the handgun was given from Mr. Coones to his mother and that his
mother had asked him to store the gun in his bedroom for his mother" (R. 191 at 22).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Willis asserts that the plain language of Article I, § 6, as it was amended in 1984,
provides that an individual's right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, and that it
grants to the legislature only the power to define the lawful use of arms. Accordingly,
Willis asserts that Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) is unconstitutional on its face
because it infringes on the right of individuals—including Willis—to merely "possess" or
have "under [their] custody or control" any firearm and subjects them to felony
prosecution and possible incarceration.
4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-10-503(2)(a) VIOLATES THE
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO BEAR AND KEEP ARMS SET FORTH IN
ARTICLE I, § 6 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
Willis asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion to dismiss on
grounds that Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) violates his individual right to bear
and keep arms set forth in Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution because it makes mere
possession of a firearm by a restricted person a crime. Utah Code Annotated § 76-10503(2)(a) essentially reads that any category I restricted person who "purchases, transfers,
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control" any firearm is guilty of a second
degree felony." The trial court denied Willis' motion on grounds that this Court in State
v. In, 2000 UT App 358, 18 P.3d 500, had ruled that this statute "does not
unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms" and that the statute "only
restricts [the right to bear arms] under very limited circumstances-such as a felony
indictment or conviction" (R. 142) (quoting In, 2000 UT 358 at ^f 14).
Willis asserts that the trial court's interpretation of this Court's holding in In is
erroneous for the following reasons:
One, this Court in In specifically did not address the issue of whether the statute as
it relates to mere possession of a firearm is constitutional on its face. In, 2000 UT App
358 at 1f 3, n.2. Similarly, this Court in State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 926 (Utah
App. 1991), refused to reach the merits of a similar constitutional challenge as to
possession of a weapon by a parolee because the issue was not raised in the trial court
and did not rise to the level of plain error. Accordingly, contrary to the triarl court's
ruling, neither this Court-or the Utah Supreme Court-has ever addressed the issue of
5

whether Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) as it relates to mere possession of a
firearm is unconstitutional on its face in regards to the current plain language of .Article L
§ 6 of the Utah Constitution.
Two, in In, the defendant actually used a firearm rather than merely possessing it.
2000 UT App 358 at ^j 2. The legislature's ability to regulate the use of arms is not
impeded by the plain language of Article I, § 6. Accordingly, this Court's statement in
In, 2000 UT App 358 at % 14, that Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a)fckdoesnot
unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms" because it "only restricts that
right under very limited circumstances-such as a felony or indictment or conviction" is
correct as it relates to use of a weapon by a restricted person-which is the factual
scenario that was presented to this Court in In. Contrary to the trial court's ruling in
denying Willis' motion to dismiss, this Court in In did not address the constitutionality
of mere possession of a firearm by a restricted person.
Willis also asserts that the trial court's interpretation of the plain language of
Article I, § 6, as it was amended in 1984, is erroneous and his reliance on earlier case law
such as State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 1974), is misplaced.
Prior to January 1, 1985, Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution read: "The people
have the right to bear arms for their security and defense, but the Legislature may regulate
the exercise of this right by law." State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677, 680 (Utah 1982). Based
upon this language the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813, 814
(Utah 1974), held that a statute which made it a class A misdemeanor for non-citizens to
possess any dangerous weapon did not violate Article I, § 6 because it "is quite evident
from the language [of the amendment] that the Legislature had sufficient power to enact
the statute in question." The Court in Beorchia also held that the statute did not violate
6

the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution because "[t]he sale, use and possession of firearms are proper subjects of
regulation by the State" and ;i[t]he Fourteenth Amendment is not generally applied so as
to restrict exercise of the police powers of the State." A few years later the Utah
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of this same statute under the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677 (Utah 1982).
The Court concluded that "the right to bear arms under the federal constitution is
collective rather than individual." 645 P.2d at 679. Based upon this conclusion, the
Court held that "an individual's right to bear arms is subject to the police power of the
various states." 645 P.2d at 679. Accordingly, the statute which made it a crime for noncitizens to possess a dangerous weapon was not prohibited by the Second Amendment
either.
After the decisions in Beorchia and Vlacil, the Utah Legislature changed the
language of Article I, § 6. This constitutional amendment was approved by the electorate
in November of 1984, and took effect on January 1, 1985. Article I, § 6 of the Utah
Constitution, as it was so amended, reads:
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense
of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes
shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from
defining the lawful use of arms.
Willis asserts that this amendment clarifies that the right to bear and possess arms
under the state constitutional is an individual right rather than a collective one. In
addition, whereas prior to the 1984 amendment, the Legislature had the ability to
"regulate the exercise" of the right to bear arms by law, now the Legislature only has the
7

ability to "defin[e] the lawful use of arms" (emphasis added). Therefore, Willis asserts
that the plain language of .Article L § 6 of the Utah Constition prevents the legislature
from limiting or restricting an individual's right to possess and keep firearms. Moreover,
"In considering the meaning of a constitutional provision, a court must begin its analysis
with the plain language of the provision and need not look beyond the plain language
unless some ambiguity is found." Utah School Boards Ass 'n v. Utah State Bd. Of
Education, 2001 UT 2,1f 13, 17 P.3d 1125 (quoting In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866
(Utah 1996). Because the plain language of Article I, § 6 provides that an individual's
right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, and because the plain language also
grants to the legislature only the power to define the lawful use of arms, Willis asserts
that Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) is unconstitutional on its face because it
infringes on the right of individuals-including Willis—to merely "possess" or have
"under [their] custody or control" any firearm and subjects them to felony prosecution
and possible incarceration.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Willis asks that this Court reverse his conviction of
possession of a firearm by a restricted person on the grounds that Utah Code Annotated §
76-10-503(2)(a) as it relates to mere possession of a firearm violates Article I, §6 of the
Utah Constitution. Willis further asks that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District
with instructions that his plea is to be withdrawn, and the matter dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBiMITTED this *23day of December, 2001.

Margaret^P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
8
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this ? 3 day of December.
2001.
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ADDENDA

10

JARED \V. ELDRIDGE (SI76)
Attorney for Defendant
ITAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOC.
245 North University Ave

J*- •;
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° C ^ j '#1

TeleDhone: 379-2570

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT, IN
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:

MOTION TO DISMISS

:

vs.

:

WADE LEON WILLIS,
Defendant.

Case No. 001403071
JUDGE STOTT
:

The defendant, WADE LEON WILLIS, through counsel JARED W. ELDRIDGE hereby
moves to dismiss the prosecution of Count I on the grounds that §76-10-503(2)(a) prohibiting the
possession of dangerous weapons by a restricted person, violates the state constitutional right to keep
and bear arms.
DATED this

3

day of January, 2001.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

JARED W. ELDRIDGE
Attorned for Defendant

.TARED W. ELDRJDGE (SI76)
Attorney for Defendant
UT \ H COUNTY PL'BLIC DEFENDER ASSOC
245 North Uni\ ersitv Ave.

1

Telephone: 379-2570

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT, IN
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff.
vs.

:

MOTION TO DISMISS

:
:

WADE LEON WILLIS,
Defendant.

Case No. 001403071
JUDGE STOTT
:

ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATUTE P JHIBITING PEOPLE ON PROBATION OR PAROLE FOR
ANY FELONY FP <M POSSESSING A DANGEROUS WEAPON VIOLATES THE
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS

Possession of weapons for any lawful purpose is protected by the 1985 revision of Article
I Section 6 of the Utah Constitution which reads:
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security
and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as
for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein
shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.

The statute with which Mr. Willis is charged §76-10-503(2)(a) purports to penalize mere
possession of weapons without any regard to the use or purpose of the weapon. It reads:

possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control:
(a)

any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony

This issue was argued but not decided in State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, (Utah App.
1991). (attached) The court, at 926, declined to reach the merits of a similar constitutional challenge
as to parolees because the issue was not raised in the trial court. The appellate court held that failure
of the trial court to have recognized the unconstitutionality of the statute was not plain error. The
Court of Appeals found no plain error holding that the new amendment to Article I, §6 of the Utah
Constitution did not obviously invalidate prior Utah authority approving restrictions of weapon
possession.
Although the Archambeau court was correct that such statutes had previously been approved,
it incorrectly discounted the Legislative history of this amendment which is attached hereto and
incorporated by reference.x The debate regarding the amendment indicates that the amendment was

1

Reference to the legislative history (in Appendix 1) is not dispositive. It appears
that when the amendment process began, the legislators desired to insure a state individual right
to keep and bear arms (House floor debates on Senate Joint Resolution No, 2, 3/7/83 pages 1-3).
It appears that the amendment was not studied by the Judiciary Interim Study Committee
or by the Constitutional Study and Revision Commission (House floor debates on Senate Joint
Resolution No. 2, 3/7/83 pages 4-5, 9-10; minutes of the Constitutional Revision Committee,
5/25/84 page 2).
The voter information pamphlet for November 6, 1984 indicates in the "Arguments For"
section that "convicted felons, mental incompetents, minors, and illegal aliens would not be
guaranteed" the right to keep and bear arms. Pamphlet page 28. In the "Rebuttal To" section,
the author warns that the language of the amendment itself makes no mention of classes of
people who are not protected by the amendment. Id.
Additional history of the amendment is found in "The Individual Right to Bear Arms: An
Illusory Public Pacifier?", 1986 Utah L.Rev. 751, 751-755 and accompanying notes.

i 9;

passed in an effect to ''overrule" and nullify the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Vlacil.
645 P.2 69". (Utah 19S2) which held that the right to bear arms was a collective rathe: than an

II

THE COURT SHOULD RELY ON THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION
IN STRIKING THIS STATUTE DOWN AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

While the Utah Constitution allows for legislation defining the lawful use of weapons, it
flatly prohibits legislation infringing on the individual right to keep and bear arms for any lawful
purpose. It states:
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security
and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as
for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein
shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 6 (1985 version in 1990 supp.).
This Court must strike the statute purporting to penalize mere possession of dangerous
weapons because it infringes the individual right to keep and bear arms and does not define a lawful
(or unlawful) use of arms.
Reference to basic tenets of federalism and Utah constitutional construction, establish that
this argument is properly raised for this Court's adjudication.
A.

PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM CALL FOR A RULING UNDER THE STATE
CONSTITUTION

As is discussed more fully below, basic tenets of federalism call for this Court to enforce the
Utah Constitution in answering this question of state law.
The United States of America is a federation of state governments. The states preceded the
federation and hold general, residual powers to govern, which are limited only by the state and

i

A O

federal constitutions. In contrast, the federal government's powers are limited to those enumerated
in the federal constitution. See e.g. Constitution of Utah States, Amendment X. This federalist form
ofgoyeipj\^
historical trust and empowerment ot local government to represent ana serve tne citizens or eacn
state. See e ^ Manning v. Sevier County 517 P.2d 549, 553-554 (Utah 1973) Crockett, J.
concurring, joined by Ellett J., Henriod, J.).
Federalist reliance on local government and limitation of centralized government is reflected
in the differences between state and federal constitutions. State constitutions are tailored to the
regions they govern; they are detailed and specific; they are dynamic. On the other hand, the federal
constitution is uniform, general, and unchanging.

Compare the frequently amended Utah

Constitution with the federal constitution. See also Utah Code Ann. Section 63-54-1 et seq. (Utah
Constitution Revision Study Commission created to study Utah Constitution, inform governor and
legislature of needed changes).
Federalism is a principle that is important in Utah. The people of this state historically have
cherished local government and fought to limit federal intrusion into questions of state law. E.g. L.J.
Arrington and D. Bitton, The Mormon Experience, 161-184. Our state Supreme Court was perhaps
the last state court to accept "incorporation" of provisions of the federal Bill of Rights. See e.g.
Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549,553 (Utah 1973)(Crockett, J. concurring, jointed by Ellett,
J., Henriod, J.) (federal incorporation doctrine is disingenuous, violative of principles of federalism;
first amendment to United States Constitution does not apply to state actors).
The question raised in this case, whether individual citizens should be allowed to possess
weapons, is a question of state law. While the federal constitution does have a provision referring
to a right to bear arms, that provision applies exclusively to federal government - not state
4

go\ernmert E g State \ Vlacil 645 P 2d 677, 679 (Utah 1982) The federal provision refers to
a LOilecu c u V wlvJi doe^ i ^ p»oteci individual

]V Tie leueia provioior is mic-pietou

narrowlv as facilitating militias Id.
Utah, like many other states has a state constitutional provision protecting the individual
right to keep and bear armb Constitution of Ltah, .Article I section 6 (19S5, in 1990 Supp ) : The
language of the current constitutional pro\ lsion relating to the indi\ ldual right to keep and bear arms
wajj passed bv a strong majority of the Ltah legislature after \ ears of negotiation and revision 'The
Individual Right to Bear Arms

An Illusor> Public Pacifier0", 1986 Utah L Rev 751, 753-754

nn 13 (attached) The language of the current constitutional prov lsion relating to the indiv ldual nght
to keep and bear arms was passed b> a strong majority of the Utah voters Id At n 12
Basic principles of federalism call on this Court to recognize and follow this constitutional
provision in deciding this case
B.

PRINCIPLES OF UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION CALL FOR A
RULING UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION

Mr Willis' argument that the statute penalizing the mere possession of weapons violates the
plain language of the Utah Constitution comports with the Utah Constitutional rule that the Utah
Constitution is to be applied in accordance with its express terms Article I section 26 of the Utah
Constitution provides
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory,
unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise
Article I section 26 (1953)

2

Reference to other state constitutional provisions and decisions is not helpful, Utah's
provision is unique and apparently the broadest in the nation See Appendix 2 (containing
provisions from other state constitutions)
•=5

us Article I section 26 of the Utah Constitution (requinng literal interpretation of Utah Constitution)
and Article V section 1 of the Utah Constitution (requiring separation of judicial, legislate e, and
e\ecuti\ e pow ers) require this Court to give effect to the plain language of .Article I section 6 (1985)
CONCLUSION
Based on the above argument and authonties Mr Willis respectfully requests this Court to
dismiss Count I, unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, on the ground
that the statute violates his individual right to bear arms as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution.
DATED this 2

day of October, 2000.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

JAREDIW. EfcDRIDGE
Attorned for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Utah County Attorney's
Office,150 East Center, Provo, Utah 84601, this

day of January, 2001.
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The argument that the plain language of the Utah Constitution should be given effect is also
consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, which is expIicitK recognized in the Utah
Constitution. Constitution of Utah, Article V section 1 (1953). Sutherland explains how judicial
allegiance to the plain language enacted by the legislature is required by the doctrine of separation
of powers:
The preference for literalism in determining the effect of a
statute is based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
The courts owe fidelity to the will of the legislature. What a
legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence
of the legislative intent or will. Therefore, the courts are bound to
give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court
has captured this idea in the following language: "It is an elementary
proposition that courts only determine by construction the scope and
intent of the law when the law itself is ambiguous or doubtful. If a
law is plain and within the legislative power, it declares itself and
nothing is left for interpretation. It is as binding upon the court as
upon every citizen. To allow a court, in such a case, to say that the
law must mean something different from the common import of its
language, because the court may think that its penalties are unwise or
harsh would make the judicial superior to the legislative branch of the
government, and practically invest it with the lawmaking power. The
remedy for a harsh law is not in interpretation but in amendment or
repeal."
Sutherland, Statutory Construction,$46.03
While this Court may deem the constitutional amendment of Article I section 6 unwise, or
even dangerous, judicial compensation is not the answer. If the legislature wants to penalize
offenders for possessing weapons, the legislature needs to propose an amendment to the constitution
and submit it to the electorate.
If this Court were to save the statute penalizing mere possession of weapons by offenders by
finding that, in defining lawful use of arms under Article I section 6, the legislature may proscribe
mere possession, the constitutional right to keep and bear arms would be an empty shell for all of

c

Hi)

of

Utan o-jL«ruy-Sicte of Utah
. Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 001403071
vs.
Judge Gary D. Stott
WADE LEON WILLIS,
Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,filedJanuary 4, 2001, and his
accompanying memorandum in support thereof The State filed an Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, and the Defendant filed a Response.
Defendant moves to dismiss Count I of this prosecution on the grounds that U.C.A. § 7610-503(2)(a) violates Defendant's right to keep and bear arms pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of
the Utah Constitution. This provision of the Utah Constitution reads:
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of
self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall
not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the
lawful use of arms.
The Defendant argues that a portion of the statute under which Defendant was charged is at odds
with this provision of the Utah Constitution, and is therefore unconstitutional. Defendant was
charged under U.C.A. § 76-10-503(2)(a), which reads:
(2) Any Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has
under his custody or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony.
Defendant maintains that the Utah Constitution has granted the legislature the power to regulate
the use of firearms, but not the possession of firearms. Defendant asserts that this statute is
unconstitutional, because it prohibits the mere possession of a firearm, the crime with which
Defendant was charged in Count I.
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The recent case of State v. In 2000 UT App. 358, addresses the constitutionality of
U.C.A.§ 76-10-503(2)(a) in light of Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. The Appellate
Court noted that u[w]hen addressing [constitutional challenges], this court presumes that the
statute is valid, and [resolves] any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." Id The court
then concluded that the statute "does not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear
arms. This statute only restricts thatrightunder very limited circumstances—such as a felony
indictment or conviction. Such restrictions are constitutional." Id (citations omitted). The court
further cited State v. Beorchia. 530 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1974), as holding that this statute is a
proper exercise of State police powers.
In light of this recent appellate decision, the Court holds that the restrictions contained in
U.C.A.§ 76-10-503(2)(a), including the restriction of mere possession of afirearmby a restricted
person, do not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms because the statute only
restricts thatrightunder very limited circumstances. Defendant's Motion is Dismiss is therefore
denied.

DATED this

^

day of _

. 2001.

BY THE COURT

GARYD. STOTT, JUDGE
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